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Practice and Procedure 
Self-executing order – construction  – whether further judicial act required for self-
executing order to take effect – whether order created issue estoppel or res judicata – 
application of principles of abuse of process  
In Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2010] QCA 207, a self-executing order had been made 
in consequence of continuing default by parties to the proceedings in meeting their disclosure 
obligations. The case involved several questions about the construction and implications of the 
self-executing order. This note focuses on the aspects of the case relating to that order. 
Facts 
The plaintiff in proceedings in the trial division (“Mango Boulevard”), the first defendant 
(“Spencer”) as trustee of the Spencer Family Trust, and the second defendant (“Perovich”), 
were parties to a joint venture. The joint venture was to be conducted through the third 
defendant company, in which Mango Boulevard, Perovich and Spencer in his capacity as 
trustee all had shares.  
Mango Boulevard commenced the proceedings on 9 March 2006. It sought declarations that 
Spencer and Perovich were in default under the Shareholders Deed to which Mango Boulevard, 
Spencer (as trustee), Perovich, and the third defendant company were all parties, and also that 
it was entitled in consequence to options to acquire Spencer’s and Perovich’s shares. Spencer 
and Perovich defended the claim and made a reciprocal counterclaim for Mango Boulevard’s 
shares.   
Spencer and Perovich failed to comply with several orders requiring them to make proper 
disclosure of documents relevant to a particular issue in the proceedings. As a result, the Chief 
Justice made a self-executing order on 3 April 2007. This order provided for the striking out of 
some paragraphs of their defence, and for judgment for Mango Boulevard on the counterclaim.  
The fourth defendant (“Mio Art”) subsequently replaced Spencer as trustee of the Spencer 
Family Trust and in that capacity succeeded to his shares. Mio Art then filed a defence to 
Mango Boulevard’s claim to Spencer’s shares and commenced a counterclaim for a declaration 
that Mio Art was entitled to Spencer’s shares and for related orders. Following continued default 
by Spencer, Perovich and Mio Art to meet their disclosure obligations, on 20 March 2008 
Chesterman J ordered that Mio Art’s defence (apart from a paragraph which contained 
admissions) and counterclaim be struck out, with no leave to re-plead. His Honour also gave 
summary judgment for Mango Boulevard on Mio Art’s counterclaim (Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v 
Spencer [2008] QSC 117). An appeal against that judgment was dismissed: Mango Boulevard 
Pty Ltd v Spencer [2008] QCA 274. 
On 3 December 2009 McMurdo J dismissed Mango Boulevard’s application for summary 
judgment. His Honour also varied that part of the 3 April 2007 self-executing order which 
provided for judgment against Spencer and Perovich [Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer 
[2009] QSC 389]. Mango Boulevard appealed against those orders. The respondents to the 
appeal were Spencer, Perovich and Mio Art. 
 In the Court of Appeal, separate reasons for judgment were delivered by Fraser and Muir JJA, 
but those reasons were substantially in agreement. White J agreed with the judgment of Fraser 
JA, and the further elaboration of particular issues provided by Muir JA. 
What steps were necessary for the self-executing order to take effect? 
Paragraph 7 of the order of 3 April 2007 provided that unless the first and second defendants 
had complied with orders in relation to their disclosure obligations by 4pm on 27 April 2007, 
“Then upon the solicitors for the plaintiff filing an affidavit deposing to the failure of the first 
and/or second defendants to do so:” parts of the amended defence and counterclaim would be 
stuck out, and “There shall be judgment for the plaintiff against the first and second defendants 
on the counterclaim,” and an order for costs against the first and second defendants.  
McMurdo J had concluded that for this order to operate as a judgment, a separate judgment had 
to be pronounced and filed under r 661(3)(a) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) 
(“UCPR”). His Honour regarded the order as prospective in terms and as falling within a class of 
self-executing orders which provide that unless the order is complied with, the innocent party 
has a right to enter judgment. His Honour was disinclined to accept that a judgment could come 
into effect upon the solicitors for one of the parties filing an affidavit deposing to default on the 
part of other parties. (Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Spencer [2009] QSC 389 at [37],[40]) 
The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion.  Relying on Goodwin v Southern 
Tablelands Finance Co Pty Ltd (1968) 42 ALJR 309 and Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529,  
Fraser JA stated (at [97]): “a self-executing order may give rise to a judgment upon satisfaction 
of expressed conditions without any further judicial act.”  The Court concluded that, upon its 
proper construction, this was the nature of the order of 3 April 2007:  all that was needed for the 
judgment to take effect was for the solicitors for the plaintiff to file an affidavit deposing to the 
default in complying with the orders relating to disclosure.  It contrasted the terms of this order 
with orders which provide that a party is or will be at liberty to enter judgment, or which direct 
the registrar to enter judgment (Fraser JA at [102], [104]; Muir JA at [5]).  
The Court of Appeal also found that the former r 661(3)(a) of the UCPR (subrule 661(3)(a) was 
omitted by r 13 of Uniform Civil Procedure Amendment Rule (No 1) 2010), which required an 
order to be filed if it is a judgment or final order, was satisfied because it was the self-executing  
order of 3 April 2007 which gave judgment. That order had been filed on 17 April 2007.  
Procedure to set aside order 
The Court of Appeal found there was a further reason why the order of 3 April 2007 should not 
have been varied. McMurdo J had concluded that any final judgment which might have arisen 
under the 3 April 2007 order had its basis in UCPR r 225(2), which provides that if a document 
is not disclosed the court might give judgment against the party who had been required to 
disclose it.  In the Court of Appeal, however, it was concluded that the order was made under 
UCPR r 374 (Failure to comply with order). This meant the judgment  could only be set aside on 
appeal: UCPR r 374(8) (Muir JA at [28]; Fraser JA at [108]–[112]).  
Did the judgment result in an issue estoppel or res judicata? 
The respondents to the appeal sought to defend the Mango Boulevard’s claim by raising an 
issue that Mango Boulevard contended was determined against the respondents by the 
judgment on the counterclaim under the order of 3 April 2007 order (or under the 20 March 2008 
order of Chesterman J).  
To deal with this submission it was first necessary to determine whether the judgment resulting 
from the failure to comply with the disclosure orders gave rise to an issue estoppel or res 
judicata. 
McMurdo J had concluded there was no issue estoppel (see Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v 
Spencer [2009] QSC 389 at [31]-[43]).  The Court of Appeal also concluded respondents on the 
appeal were not prevented by the doctrines of issue estoppel or res judicata from raising the 
matter they sought to raise on the appeal.  
The Court of Appeal, it was noted that it had long been accepted that it was possible a default 
judgment or order may give rise to a res judicata or issue estoppel. Fraser JA referred, for 
example (at [116]), to a judgment based on a default of pleading, which may be explained on 
the ground that the party in default has or should be taken to have admitted the allegations. 
Such judgments were distinguished from judgments or orders dismissing proceedings for want 
of prosecution, or for non-compliance with obligations to disclose documents under procedural 
rules or pursuant to a court order.  Judgments of the latter kind did not involved a decision on  
on the merits so as to create an issue estoppel or give rise to a res judicata (Muir JA at [55], 
Fraser JA at [114], [116]).  
The Court concluded that in these circumstances, an application for the court to exercise its 
inherent power to strike out a proceeding as an abuse of process was the appropriate response 
by a party facing subsequent proceedings, rather than the more inflexible response of res 
judicata or issue estoppel (Muir JA at [60], Fraser JA at [117]). 
Even if it the judgment of 3 April 2007 was otherwise capable of giving rise to an issue estoppel, 
the Court of Appeal was satisfied the judgment was explicable on a ground which did not 
involve rejection of the particular defence sought to be raised by the respondents, and it 
therefore did not preclude the respondents from litigating the point sought to be raised as a 
defence to Mango Boulevard’s claim. 
Was there an abuse of process? 
It was also argued on the appeal that it would be an abuse of process for the respondents to re-
agitate a particular point argued to have formed part of pleadings which had been struck out and 
in respect of which there was explicitly no leave given to amend.  
McMurdo J had concluded that there was no identifiable prejudice to Mango Boulevard from the 
respondents being allowed to argue the issue they sought to raise by way of defence. 
The judgments in the Court of Appeal provide a useful discussion of the concept of abuse of 
process and of the authorities which have considered some of the matters relevant to a 
consideration of whether particular conduct constitutes an abuse of process. Though finding that 
in the particular circumstances before the Court the considerations were fairly evenly balanced, 
the Court concluded the primary judge was correct in deciding that the mounting of the defence 
sought to be raised by the defendants was not an abuse of process (Muir JA at [29–[53], Fraser 
JA at [145]-[155]). 
Orders 
The Court set aside the order of McMurdo J varying the order of 3 April 2007, but otherwise 
dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay respondent’s costs of the appeal to be 
assessed on the standard basis. 
Comment 
A self-executing order is a valuable remedy to be sought against a litigant who repeatedly fails 
to comply with procedural rules or court orders.  
This case clearly demonstrates the importance of considering the implications of any self-
executing order, and of ensuring clarity in the wording of any such order. In particular, it should 
be absolutely clear whether a judgment is to come into existence without any further judicial act. 
Every step should also be taken to avoid future uncertainty in determining whether judgment 
has resulted. In circumstances such as those in this case, for example, there may have been 
doubt as to whether purported compliance with the order for disclosure was actual compliance. 
Although the respondents would have the opportunity to challenge the existence of any default 
deposed by the appellant’s solicitors, such disputes are undesirable. Uncertainty may be 
minimised if the conditions which must be met are straightforward and are set out in clear 
language. 
 
 
